Pace Environmental Law Review
Volume 32
Issue 2 Reconceptualizing the Future of
Environmental Law
Spring 2015

Article 2

April 2015

Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law: The Role of
Private Climate Governance
Michael P. Vandenbergh
Vanderbilt University Law School

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr
Part of the Energy and Utilities Law Commons, Environmental Law Commons, and the Natural
Resources Law Commons

Recommended Citation
Michael P. Vandenbergh, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law: The Role of
Private Climate Governance, 32 Pace Envtl. L. Rev. 382 (2015)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.pace.edu/pelr/vol32/iss2/2
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Pace Environmental Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace.
For more information, please contact dheller2@law.pace.edu.

2_VANDENBERGH FINAL

9/30/2015 1:12 PM

2015 SYMPOSIUM:
KEYNOTE ADDRESS

Reconceptualizing the Future of
Environmental Law: The Role of Private
Climate Governance
MICHAEL P. VANDENBERGH*
The title of this Symposium, Re-conceptualizing the Future of
Environmental Law, accurately captures the challenge facing
environmental law scholars and policymakers in 2015. The
success of environmental law in the future will not arise from
doubling down on the approaches developed over the last 50
years. Instead, it will arise from our willingness to learn from the
past without being bound by the conceptual frameworks that
dominated the early development of the field.
In particular, a successful future for environmental law is
more likely to emerge if we acknowledge that the environmental
problems, policy plasticity, and regulatory institutions that
shaped the early decades of the field are no longer dominant, and
if we develop new responses that reflect the shifts that have
occurred on each of these points. I begin by identifying several
important shifts in environmental problems, policy plasticity, and
institutions. I then explore how new conceptual frameworks—
sometimes explicit and sometimes not—are already leading to

* David Daniels Allen Distinguished Chair of Law, Director, Climate
Change Research Network, and Co-Director, Energy, Environment and Land
Use Program, Vanderbilt University Law School. My thanks go to Jason
Czarnezki and the students of the Pace Environmental Law Review for
organizing the 2015 Pace Environmental Law Review Symposium, Reconceptualizing the Future of Environmental Law. The faculty and student
participants provided very helpful comments on this project, and the student
editors did an excellent job editing the keynote address into this article.
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new responses to some of the most challenging environmental
issues.
No environmental issue is more challenging than climate
change, and physicist Jonathan Gilligan and I have argued for a
conceptual shift that involves recognizing the opportunity to buy
time with private governance.1 We have not argued that private
governance is a complete response or that it is the only new
approach to climate change, but we have asserted that private
initiatives can achieve a private governance wedge––emissions
reductions that grow each year and average a billion tons per
year over the 2016-2025 period.2 By drawing on existing
efficiency incentives and motivations to reduce corporate and
household carbon emissions, private initiatives can buy time
while national and international governmental processes are in
gridlock. In addition, many of these initiatives can complement a
carbon price after it is adopted. The challenge is to make the
conceptual shift: to move beyond the early history of

1. See generally Michael P. Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock: The Private Governance Response to Climate Change, 40 COLUM. J.
ENVTL. L. (forthcoming 2015), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2533643
[hereinafter Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock]. For a short summary of
the ideas presented at this keynote address, see TEDx, Can Your Company Stop
Global Warming? Michael P. Vandenbergh at TEDxNashville (May 11, 2014),
YOUTUBE, http://youtu.be/2bXNcEQ6QX0, archived at https://perma.cc/99CNKJ9Y.
2. Other promising new approaches that do not assume a comprehensive
international or national carbon price include polycentric governance. See
generally Robert O. Keohane & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for
Climate Change, 9 PERSP. ON POL. 7, 7 (2011) (advocating for a climate change
regime complex); John R. Nolon, In Praise of Parochialism: The Advent of Local
Environmental Law, 26 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 363 (2002) (land use law at the
local level); Elinor Ostrom, Nested Externalities and Polycentric Institutions:
Must We Wait for Global Solutions to Climate Change Before Taking Actions at
Other Scales?, 49 ECON. THEORY 353 (2012); Matt Potoski & Aseem Prakash,
Green Clubs: Collective Action and Voluntary Environmental Programs, 16 ANN.
REV. OF POL. SCI. 399 (2013) (conceptualize voluntary environmental programs
as clubs); Benjamin K. Sovacool, An International Comparison of Four
Polycentric Approaches to Climate and Energy Governance, 39 ENERGY POL’Y
3832 (2011); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building a More Effective Global Climate
Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 273, 274
(2013) (identifying bottom-up mitigation strategies). For a view on private
climate governance from a political science perspective, see JESSICA GREEN,
RETHINKING PRIVATE AUTHORITY: AGENTS AND ENTREPRENEURS IN GLOBAL
ENVIRONMENTAL GOVERNANCE (2013).
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environmental law and recognize that environmental governance
is not synonymous with public governance.
I.

LEARNING AND UNLEARNING THE LESSONS
OF HISTORY

History can be a guide to the future, but it also can create
blinders that hinder our ability to recognize and develop effective
responses to new problems. The idea that generals fight the last
war is mentioned so often that it has become trite, but it is
uncomfortably true regarding environmental law and policy.
Three often unstated assumptions fit into that category. The first
is that the environmental problems of today are not exceptional—
that they differ, if at all, only in degree from the problems of the
past. The second is that the policy plasticity of the past—the
ability to adopt comprehensive legislation at the national level
and international agreements at the global level—exists today
much as it did in the heyday of environmental lawmaking from
1970 to 1990.3 The third is that the most important regulatory
institutions––including the regulatory actors, actions and
targets––of the 1970-1990 period remain the same today. All
three of these assumptions no longer hold true, and the sooner we
abandon them, the sooner we will be able to generate the
creativity and momentum necessary to fashion a future for
environmental law that we can all be proud of decades from now.
A. Environmental Problems
As to the problems of today, climate change is simply
different from earlier threats. Whether it is “the mother of all
collective action problems”4 or just the most challenging collective
action problem, no environmental threat addressed by the
statutory framework erected in 1970-1990 matches climate
change in the magnitude and irreversibility of the potential
3. The onset of gridlock at the international level arguably began in 2000
rather than 1990. JONATHAN M. HARRIS & BRIAN ROACH, THE ECONOMICS OF
GLOBAL CLIMATE CHANGE 35 (2007).
4. Sarah Krakoff, Fragmentation, Morality, and the Law of Global Warming
28 (Colorado Law Legal Studies Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 0710, 2007); see also Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, 94 CORNELL L. REV.
1153, 1155–56 (2009).
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harm, the cost of the response, the global scale, the deep
integration of environmental harms and economic activity, and
the justice concerns between developed and developing countries
and between current and future generations.
The last point about future generations is particularly easy to
overlook in debates about the appropriate responses to climate
change. Policy debates tend to focus on the next several months
or years, and justice advocates often focus on the burdens of
climate mitigation and the wealth disparity among populations
living in developed and developing countries today, rather than
the tens or hundreds of future generations that will live in a
disrupted world.5 Psychologists tell us that near-term, vivid,
local events are most likely to affect beliefs, norms and behavior,
but the most certain and most severe climate events are far
easier to project over a long-term and global scale.6 Economists’
arguments regarding the use of discount rates reinforce this
temporal lens. The value of the climate change harms that will
be avoided in future centuries is miniscule in the calculus after
the application of almost any non-zero discount rate.7
Not surprisingly, policy debates and scientific reports follow
this pattern as well. The debate over the Waxman-Markey cap
and trade bill in 2008-2009 often focused more on the several
hundred dollar annual increase in the average household
5. See generally Michael Vandenbergh & Jonathan M. Gilligan, Macro
Risks: The Challenge for Rational Risk Regulation, 22 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F.
401 (2011) [hereinafter Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Macro Risks].
6. See Michael P. Vandenbergh & Kaitlin Raimi Toner, Climate Change:
Leveraging Legacy, 41 ECOL. L.Q. 139 (2015) [hereinafter Vandenbergh &
Raimi, Leveraging Legacy].
7. See Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant, Introduction, in DISCOUNTING AND
INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY 15 (Paul R. Portney & John P. Weyant eds., 1999)
(“Assume . . . that the gross domestic product of the world will be $8 quadrillion
in the year 2200 in current dollars. Suppose that we want to calculate the
present value of that sum using the 7% discount rate that the Office of
Management and Budget recommends for such purposes. The answer we get is
a surprising $10 billion. In other words, it would not make sense for the world’s
present inhabitants to expend more than $10 billion today (or about $2 per
person) on a measure that would prevent the loss of the entire GDP of the world
200 years from now.”). For a recent assessment of the costs of climate change if
climate disruption affects the economic growth assumptions included in
economic models, see Frances C. Moore & Delevane B. Diaz, Temperature
Impacts on Economic Growth Warrant Stringent Mitigation Policy, 5 NATURE
CLIMATE CHANGE 127, 127-28 (2015). See also HARRIS & ROACH, supra note 3, at
35.
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electricity bill than the multigenerational benefits of reducing
carbon emissions. Similarly, scientific reports about projected sea
level rise often end in 2100, and the public debate commonly
focuses on whether the common estimate of a two-foot sea level
rise in 2100 is too high or low.8 Yet even if carbon emissions peak
today and decline substantially over the following decades, sea
levels will still be increasing 1,000 years from now.9 Although
the precise future sea levels are not clear, the likely increase is
far above two feet and could easily be tens of feet, with more to
come. In short, we are acting as if the deep future holds
essentially no value to us today. No other environmental issue,
with the possible exception of nuclear waste disposal, raises a
similar concern.
B. Policy Plasticity
As Michael Gerrard has demonstrated in a clever
photograph, federal environmental regulations have grown to the
point where the stack of environmental volumes of the Code of
Federal Regulations dwarfs the stack of Internal Revenue Service
tax regulations.10 A natural conclusion from viewing these stacks
is that government responses to environmental problems are
robust. EPA’s recent climate regulations provide some support for
that view, but by now many of us have noted that no major
federal pollution control statute has been enacted in the United
States (U.S.) in the last quarter century.11 The statutory
8. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Macro Risks, supra note 5, at 425. See
generally Ann Powers, Sea Level Rise and Its Impact on Vulnerable States: Four
Examples, 73 LA. L. REV. 151 (2012) (discussing the effects of sea level rise).
9. See INTERGOVERNMENTAL PANEL ON CLIMATE CHANGE (IPCC), CLIMATE
CHANGE 2001: SYNTHESIS REPORT 89 (Robert T. Watson et al. eds., 2001),
available at http://www.grida.no/publications/other/ipcc_tar/, archived at
http://perma.cc/96BH-RLFF.
10. Michael Gerrard, Photograph, 2014 (copy on file with the author).
11. See, e.g., Todd Aagard, Environmental Law Outside the Canon, 89 IND.
L.J. 1239,1239-41 (2014) (noting absence of major statutes and arguing for
embedded and disbursed public environmental governance); Richard Lazarus,
Congressional Descent: The Demise of Deliberative Democracy in Environmental
Law, 94 GEO. L.J. 619, 619, 629 (2006) (describing congressional action in mid2000s as “effectively moribund”); David Uhlmann, The Quest for a Sustainable
Future, 1 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. 1, 9 (2012) (noting absence of statutes);
Michael P. Vandenbergh, The Emergence of Private Environmental Governance,
44 ENVTL. L. REP. 10125, 10132 (2014) (providing chart of major pollution
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authority behind Gerrard’s regulatory pile is critical for effective
climate mitigation, but the legislative process has been in virtual
gridlock since the fall of 1990.
We can debate the causes, and the gridlock could break at
any moment, but the legislative inaction in the U.S. is at least a
cautionary note about the likelihood of major new legislation in
the near term.12 For some environmental problems, legislative
inaction at the federal level is a rational response: The statutes
are up to the task, and the environmental issues are largely in
hand. Yet few believe that the statutory framework erected
during the 1970-1990 period provides the optimal national
response across the board. Efforts to achieve many objectives––
whether to scale back the federal role, to make existing
instruments more efficient, to address new problems, or to
increase the use of emissions trading and other innovative new
instruments––have all failed since the Clean Air Act
Amendments of 1990.
Although these objectives are important, the best argument
for legislative action is that the federal statutory framework is
woefully inadequate to address climate change. EPA’s use of
existing authorities to reduce emissions from motor vehicle
emissions, new major stationary sources, and existing electric
generating units, when combined with state and local actions, the
growth of natural gas supplies, and other factors, should make it
possible for the U.S. to achieve the 17% emissions reduction
target announced in connection with the Copenhagen
negotiations in 2009.13 But it is important to recognize just how
modest that target is: achieving the 17% reduction from 2005
levels by 2020 will leave U.S. annual emissions in 2020 higher by
almost 4%, or roughly 200 million metric tons per year, than if

control statutes 1970-2013); Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129, 129 (2013) (noting a two decade absence of
major pollution control statutes) [hereinafter Vandenbergh, Private
Environmental Governance].
12. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at
131-32.
13. Darren Samuelsohn and Lisa Friedman, Obama Announces 2020
Emissions Target, Dec. 9 Copenhagen Visit, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/cwire/2009/11/25/25climatewire-obama-announces-2020
-emissions-target-dec-9-22088.html?pagewanted=all, archived at http://perma.cc
/ZV62-WQ77.
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the U.S. had achieved its Kyoto target of 7% emissions reductions
from 1990 levels during the 2008-2012 Kyoto compliance period.14
In addition, the prospects for adopting and implementing a
carbon price at the national and international levels over the next
decade are dim.15 In the U.S., a carbon tax or cap and trade
system is possible in the near term, but unlikely. The legislation
would have to draw on widespread, but weak, support from the
U.S. population to overcome concentrated opposition from the
fossil fuel industry and from advocates of smaller government.16
The House of Representatives is unlikely to support a meaningful
carbon price with its current membership, and the current
configuration of congressional districts makes near-term change
unlikely.17 In the Senate, sixty votes would be required, even in
the absence of a Presidential veto.18 An international agreement
with credible commitments for emissions reductions has been
difficult to achieve, and even if the negotiations succeed,

14. These figures are based on the following assumptions and calculations:
1990 levels were 6,233.23 million metric tons, so a 7% reduction from 1990
levels is 5,796.9039 million metric tons. In 2005 levels were 7,253.78 million
metric tons, so a 17% reduction from 2005 levels is 6,020.6374 million tons. The
difference is 6,020.6374 - 5,796.9039 = 223.7335. The percentage change is
223.7335 / 5,796.9039 = 3.859534397%. This assumes that emissions would have
remained constant after the Kyoto reductions. Data for calculations, see
Greenhouse Gas Inventory Data Explorer, EPA (July 21, 2014),
http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/ghgemissions/inventoryexplorer/index.html#a
llsectors/allgas/econsect/all, archived at http://perma.cc/PVB5-AXWD.
15. For a discussion, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra
note 1, at 19.
16. See, e.g., Public’s Policy Priorities For 2015, PEW RESEARCH CENTER (Jan.
15,
2015),
http://www.people-press.org/2015/01/15/publics-policy-prioritiesreflect-changing-conditions-at-home-and-abroad/1-15-2015-priorities_01/,
archived at http://perma.cc/A2CV-LRP2 (reporting that “global warming” ranks
22nd of 23 issues).
17. See Joe Williams & Anthony Salvanto, Control of the House and
Redistricting’s
Effect,
CBS
NEWS
(Nov.
4,
2012,
11:15
AM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/control-of-the-house-and-redistrictings-effect/,
archived at http://perma.cc/T2AZ-V5G7.
18. One way to bypass this barrier is to adopt climate legislation as an
appropriations measure. That is difficult to do, but the process used for the
Affordable Care Act suggests that it is not impossible. See generally, Fillibuster
and Cloture, U.S. SENATE, https://www.senate.gov/artandhistory/history/
common/briefing/Filibuster_Cloture.htm (last visited Apr. 5, 2015), archived at
https://perma.cc/6JDG-4CDM.
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ratification of a treaty in the U.S. will require sixty-seven votes in
the Senate.19
A more likely approach is a continuation of recent piecemeal
efforts that seek to reduce U.S. emissions and induce movement
by other countries without requiring congressional action.20
These may be the most viable efforts, but they are unlikely to
yield adequate levels of emissions reductions in the near term.
Meanwhile, every decade of delay locks in almost one degree
Fahrenheit of increased global average temperature and a forty
percent increase in costs.21
I certainly do not have a crystal ball, and legislators could
respond to shifts in public opinion in the event of major heat
waves, droughts, or other natural events. Movement by other
countries also could occur and could change the political
landscape in the U.S. Yet even as climate scientists have become
more certain about the role of humans in causing climate change,
a large segment of the American population has become less
certain.22 In addition, even after a major climate bill is adopted,
several years will be necessary to fully implement a national
carbon price.23 An international carbon price will take even
19. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2.
20. See, e.g., Elinor Ostrom, A Long Polycentric Journey, 13 ANN. REV. OF
POL. SCI. 1, 5-6 (2010) (examining polycentric responses to climate change);
DAVID G. VICTOR, GLOBAL WARMING GRIDLOCK: CREATING MORE EFFECTIVE
STRATEGIES FOR PROTECTING THE PLANET 264 (2011) (discussing strategy
involving clubs of countries); Richard B. Stewart et al., Building a More Effective
Global Climate Regime Through a Bottom-Up Approach, 14 THEORETICAL
INQUIRIES L. 273, 274 (2013) (evaluating bottom-up initiatives); see generally,
Kenneth W. Abbott, Strengthening the Transnational Regime Complex for
Climate Change, 88 TRANSNAT’L ENVTL. L. 543 (2012) (examining global private
governance initiatives); Daniel C. Esty, Bottom-up Climate Fix, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 21, 2014, http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/22/opinion/bottom-up-climatefix.html?ref=opinion, archived at http://perma.cc/8B98-2NMU (evaluating
bottom-up initiatives); Sarah Light, The New Insider Trading: Markets within
the Firm, 34 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. (2015) (examining carbon markets within firms);
Eric Orts, Climate Contracts, 29 VA. ENVTL. L. J. 197, 232 (2010) (proposing
contracting arrangements).
21. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 7.
22. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Energy and Climate Change: A
Climate Prediction Market, 61 UCLA L. REV. 1962, 1964 (2014) [hereinafter
Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market].
23. American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (ACES), H.R. 2454,
111th Cong. (2009) (bill was defeated in the Senate).
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longer. After a carbon price begins to bite, the legislation not only
will have to survive repeal efforts (something the recent
Australian carbon tax could not do), but also increase over time.
All of these favorable outcomes are possible, but it is risky to be
overly optimistic about the policy plasticity of an adequate carbon
price or any other comprehensive legislative response.
C. Regulatory Institutions
In addition to shifts in environmental problems and policy
plasticity, the available regulatory institutions have changed
since the 1970-1990 period. This includes not only the regulatory
actors, but also the regulatory actions and targets. The shift has
occurred in ways that affect the most promising strategies for
climate mitigation and the future of environmental law more
generally.
1. Actors
When confronted by a major social problem, many policy
analysts ask: “What can government do?”24 Our vocabulary
reinforces this framing. Terms ranging from “policymaker” and
“regulation” to “international” all signal that government is the
actor seeking to shift behavior. But why not ask: “What can any
organization do?” When we re-frame the question this way, it is
easy see a broader range of actors that can and do address
environmental problems. For example, private corporations,
advocacy groups, and other non-profit groups are performing
standard-setting and enforcement functions across a wide range
of environmental problems.25
Private governance is not new. If private governance occurs
when private organizations play the traditional governmental
roles of reducing negative externalities, managing common pool
resources, and promoting the production of public goods, then
various forms of private governance have been in place for
24. See, e.g., Michael Levi, The Hidden Risks of Energy Innovation, ISSUES IN
SCI. & TECH. (2013), available at http://issues.org/29-2/michael-2/, archived at
http://perma.cc/GH3U-ELUQ (stating that “[d]omestic policy design faces one
central question: Where should government intervene?”).
25. For an overview, see Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance,
supra note 11, at 141-47.
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decades or centuries.26
Private standards have regulated
everything from food production in ancient times, to medieval
labor practices, to late nineteenth century fire safety.27 But a
remarkable expansion has occurred over the last several decades
in the role that private organizations play in environmental
protection.28 The private organizations playing this role include
not only corporations and advocacy groups, but also private
standards and certification organizations, private universities,
religious organizations, labor groups, and other private non-profit
groups. Although the effects of these private environmental
governance activities are not well understood, in many cases the
groups appear be filling important gaps in public environmental
governance.29
2. Actions
In turn, viewing a new set of actors as playing an
environmental governance role can open up new possibilities for
the types of actions that can be taken. Whether the framework is
26. Common law torts could be considered a form of public or private law, but
I place torts outside the private environmental governance category given the
strong public role in adjudicating and enforcing tort judgments. See Sarah E.
Light & Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, in
ENVIRONMENTAL DECISION MAKING, ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
(Robert Glicksman & LeRoy Paddock eds., forthcoming 2015).
27. See TIMOTHY LYTTON, KOSHER: PRIVATE REGULATION IN THE AGE OF
INDUSTRIAL FOOD 70-103 (2012) (food); RACHEL P. MAINES, ASBESTOS AND FIRE:
TECHNOLOGICAL TRADEOFFS AND THE BODY AT RISK (2005) (fire safety); Kenneth
W. Abbott & Duncan Snidal, The Governance Triangle: Regulatory Standards
Institutions and the Shadow of the State, in THE POLITICS OF GLOBAL
REGULATION 44, 46 (Walter Mattli & Ngaire Woods eds., 2009) (climate change
mitigation at global level); Tim Bartley, Certifying Forests and Factories: States,
Social Movements, and the Rise of Private Regulation in the Apparel and Forest
Products Fields, 31 POL. & SOC’Y 433, 433–34 (2003) (forests); Marc Allen Eisner,
Private Environmental Governance in Hard Times: Markets for Virtue and the
Dynamics of Regulatory Change, 12 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES IN L. 489, 489 (2011)
(climate change mitigation); Errol E. Meidinger, Environmental Certification
Programs and U.S. Environmental Law: Closer Than You Think, 31 ENVTL. L.
REP. 10162, 10162 (2001) (forests); David Vogel, The Private Regulation of Global
Corporate Conduct, 49 BUS. & SOC’Y 68, 68 (2010) (business ethics).
28. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at
129.
29. See STEERING COMM. OF STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS
& CERTIFICATION, TOWARD SUSTAINABILITY: THE ROLES AND LIMITATIONS OF
CERTIFICATION 9 (2012) (citing studies).
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Kip Viscusi’s four institutional mechanisms,30 Jim Salzman’s five
regulatory categories,31 or other ways to describe the tools
available to address environmental problems, private governance
in many cases offers private parallels to the instruments typically
used by government (e.g., command and control regulation,
market mechanisms, and informational regulation)32 and to the
subject matter areas of environmental law (e.g., air, toxics, and
fisheries).33 The new instruments include private standards and
certification systems, private supply chain requirements,
corporate employee efficiency programs, non-governmental
organization (NGO) social norm initiatives, and many others.
For example, when NGOs pressure banks to disclose and
reduce the environmental effects of their borrowers’ projects, the
result is not federal regulation or an international agreement, but
a set of private standards called the Equator Principles.34 The
vast majority of global project finance lending is now conducted
by banks that have agreed to comply with the Equator Principles.
These private standards were produced through a process that
closely resembles Administrative Procedure Act notice-andcomment rulemaking, and the standards require borrowers to
conduct environmental studies that are similar to those required
for major federal actions under the National Environmental
Policy Act.
Similarly, after failed efforts in the 1980s to generate an
international agreement on forestry issues, NGOs and major
forest products firms formed the Forest Stewardship Council

30. W. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social
Insurance, Government Regulation and Contemporary Risks to Health and
Safety, 6 YALE J. ON REG. 65, 65 (1989) (identifying four institutional
mechanisms: government regulation, market forces, liability, and social
insurance).
31. James Salzman, Teaching Policy Instrument Choice in Environmental
Law: The Five P's, 23 DUKE ENVTL. L. & POL’Y F. 363, 363, 374 n.29 (2013)
(identifying five environmental regulation categories: prescription, property,
penalties, payments and persuasion).
32. See Sarah E. Light & Eric W. Orts, Parallels in Public and Private
Environmental Governance, 5 MICH. J. ENVTL. & ADMIN. L. (forthcoming 2015)
(discussing public-private instrument parallels).
33. See Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at
133-34 (discussing public-private subject matter parallels).
34. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh, Private Environmental
Governance, supra note 11, at 151.
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(FSC), a private standard, certification, and labeling system.35
Private certification systems such as FSC now apply to roughly
fifteen percent of all temperate forests, and a smaller but still
substantial share of other forests.36 Similarly, the Marine
Stewardship Council (MSC), another private standards,
certification, and labeling system now sets sustainability
standards for fisheries that supply almost ten percent of global
fish landings for human consumption.37 The figure is roughly
fifty percent of all fish caught in the U.S. for human consumption,
and a quick look at the fish sandwich available at the leading fast
food restaurant in the U.S. will provide an example of the MSC
label.38
These examples of collectively set private standards do not
require a major departure from typical conceptions of
environmental governance, although government takes a back
seat to private organizations in these private governance
initiatives. Other forms of private environmental governance are
more challenging. Examples include the inclusion of
environmental requirements in supply chain contracting
arrangements, corporate programs that target employees’
household energy use, and NGO programs that target household
carbon emissions. Although these initiatives do not fit as neatly
into traditional conceptions of governance, they play comparable
roles to government regulations and programs by reducing
negative externalities, managing common pool resources, and
producing public goods.
3. Sources
The shift in the actors and actions that are considered part of
environmental governance also can affect our conception of the
sources of environmental harms and the targets of environmental
governance. Most important, when private governance is a
possibility, the behavior of sources that are largely beyond the
reach of traditional government regulatory tools may become
easier to influence. Two examples demonstrate this point.
35.
36.
37.
38.

Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
Id. at 150.
Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, supra note 11, at 150.
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First, when the House Commerce Committee was preparing
to draft the legislation that eventually become the WaxmanMarkey cap-and-trade bill, the staff produced a series of very
thoughtful reports identifying the sources of carbon emissions
and the range of potential legislative responses.39 The report on
the sources of emissions took a conventional approach, drawing
on the EPA annual greenhouse gas inventory to identify the
leading sources in the U.S. Using this conceptual framework,
electric generation and transportation appeared to contribute
roughly a third of U.S. emissions, and traditional government
regulation of power plants and motor vehicle manufacturers
appeared to be the obvious response. In contrast, the “residential”
share was only five percent, a number that suggests little need to
allocate major regulatory resources in that direction.40
Referring to this small share, the Committee staff noted that
households and other small contributors were not promising
targets of climate legislation. Yet the 5% figure excluded from the
residential share all of the emissions associated with household
electricity use and personal motor vehicle transportation, both
activities that are under the substantial direct control of most
households. When these emissions are included in the residential
share, the total is roughly a third to 40% of U.S. emissions.41
Viewed in this light, household and personal motor vehicle energy
use merit more attention.
In turn, new types of actions can be taken if the sources
include households, not just electric power plants or auto
manufacturers. Many low-cost, non-intrusive behavioral and
other options that are not appropriate for large industrial sources
39. See Michael P. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge:
Designing and Adopting Effective Carbon Emissions Reduction Programs, 40
ENVTL. L. REP. 10547, figs.1 & 2 (2010) [hereinafter Vandenbergh et al.,
Implementing the Behavioral Wedge].
40. Id. This approach still dominates EPA’s presentation of carbon emissions
data. See EPA, INVENTORY OF GREENHOUSE GASES AND SINKS: 1990-2011 (2013),
available at http://www.epa.gov/climatechange/Downloads/ghgemissions/USGHG-Inventory-2013-Main-Text.pdf, archived at http://perma.cc/7ZPN-RJTB.
41. Vandenbergh et al., Implementing the Behavioral Wedge, supra note 39,
at 10549 n.12. Individuals or households are not the only sources that are often
overlooked. See, e.g., Daniel A. Farber, Controlling Pollution by Individuals and
Other Dispersed Sources, 35 ENVTL. L. REP. 10745 (2005) (noting the importance
of small businesses). See also Sarah E. Light, The Military-Industrial Complex,
55 B.C. L. REV. 879 (2014) (focusing on Military consumption of energy).
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are effective for households.42 Not only is the range of actions
broader if households are viewed as an important source, but it
may be easier for a range of private organizations (e.g., NGOs,
utilities, and corporations through customer and employee
programs) to steer household behavior than it is for governments
to do so.43 An example is the eco-driving program that has
emerged through a cooperative effort between major
environmental NGOs and automakers.44
A second example demonstrates how re-conceptualizing the
actors and actions of environmental governance can affect our
view of the sources of an environmental problem. When we think
of the sources of toxic chemicals, we often think of the industrial
facilities that release toxics from the smokestack. Programs
ranging from Section 112 of the Clean Air Act, to the hazardous
waste management requirements of the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act, to the Toxic Release Inventory industrial
facility reporting program are built on this model: They regulate
or require reporting of toxic emissions from large facilities.
Although large volumes of toxics also go out the door in the
products made by these facilities, the government regulatory
scheme for the most part does not extend to the consumption end
of the toxics lifecycle.
In recent years, private organizations have developed
initiatives developed on the premise that the seller of goods, not
just the manufacturer of the goods, is the source of the emissions.
The result is a series of NGO reputation campaigns that target
corporations, and commitments by Target, Wal-Mart, and other
retailers to use supply chain contracting requirements to ban a
long list of toxics from the products they buy. In a sense, this is
the modern version of the pollution prevention concept that was
popular in the late 1980s through mid-1990s. It was very difficult
42. See Jason J. Czarnezki, Everyday Environmentalism: Concerning
Consumption, 41 ENVTL. L. REP. 10374, 10374 (2011); Thomas Dietz et al.,
Household Action Can Provide a Behavioral Wedge to Rapidly Reduce US
Carbon Emissions, 106 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 18452, 18452 (2009).
43. A recent possible exception is the demand reduction building block of the
Clean Power Plan. See Amanda Carrico et al., US Climate Policy Needs
Behavioral Science, 5 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 177 (2015).
44. See Jack N. Barkenbus, Eco-driving: An Overlooked Climate Change
Initiative, 38 ENERGY POL’Y 762, 765 (2010); Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 55-56.
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for government to pursue pollution prevention opportunities
aggressively given its limited statutory authorities and concerns
about intrusion into industrial and commercial processes, but
private governance initiatives are doing so.45 As a leading
chemical industry trade association executive recently observed
in response to failed federal toxics efforts, “[t]he loss of public
confidence [means] we’re going to increasingly have retailers that
are regulators, like Wal-Mart and Target.”46
4. Effects
Are these private environmental governance initiatives
effective? Some private initiatives may be closer to greenwashing
than governance, but that is unlikely for many types of private
environmental governance given the participants, incentives, and
transparency.47
In addition, many forms of private
environmental governance are widespread, suggesting that if
they do affect behavior, they can have large environmental
effects.48 More research is needed, but the important question to
ask when assessing the efficacy of any governance initiative,
whether public or private, is “as compared to what other viable
option?” A complete solution is often not the goal of many private
environmental initiatives, but if we ignore the limited policy
plasticity of most comprehensive government responses, we may
overlook private responses that can provide a partial answer and
can be adopted and implemented given the existing policy
plasticity.

45. See Pollution Prosecution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-593, 104 stat. 2962
(1990). For a discussion of concerns about government involvement in industrial
processes as reflected in the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, see
ROBERT V. PERCIVAL ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATION LAW, SCIENCE, AND
POLICY (7th ed. 2013).
46. Upcoming Lautenberg Bill Could Be Key Test for TSCA Reform This
Congress, INSIDE EPA WEEKLY REPORT, Apr. 1, 2011, at 1, 6.
47. See STEERING COMM. OF STATE-OF-KNOWLEDGE ASSESSMENT OF STANDARDS
& CERTIFICATION, supra note 29.
48. I examined the top firms by sales in eight leading sectors and found that
more than half of the firms (three quarters by sales, suggesting that larger firms
do more of this than smaller firms) impose environmental requirements on their
suppliers. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of
Private Contracting in Global Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913, 916–17 (2007).
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Will private governance initiatives make public governance
less likely? Private governance initiatives could displace or
compete with public governance, or they could play a gap-filling
role, stepping in when government lacks the political capital,
resources or expertise to act. They also could play a
complementary or accelerating role.49 Far more research is
needed on the extent to which private governance plays these
roles and the conditions under which it does so. In the interim, it
is important to avoid the temptation to assume either negative or
positive spillover.
II.

THE PRIVATE CLIMATE GOVERNANCE
WEDGE

As I mentioned at the outset, climate change will drive the
evolution of environmental law and policy, and government
responses are in gridlock. Jonathan Gilligan and I have argued
that private governance initiatives can complement public
measures and generate a private climate governance wedge in the
interim.50 Perhaps the greatest challenge to this argument is the
view that only the coercive power and resources of government
can achieve meaningful levels of emissions reductions. Engineers
and others have used bottom-up studies to argue that a large
efficiency gap exists, which, if closed, could yield several billion
tons of emissions reductions worldwide.51 Economists often argue
that there are no twenty-dollar bills sitting on sidewalks and
have gone so far as to describe the efficiency gap as an “engineer’s
fallacy.”52 The overall size of the efficiency gap is beyond the
49. The emergence of the FSC standard after the collapse of international
forestry governance efforts is an example of the gap-filling role that private
governance can play. Private standards such as the chemical industry’s
Responsible Care program may be both an effort to supplement government
regulation and an effort to enhance a sector’s reputation to head off more
intrusive government regulation (e.g., after the Bhopal disaster). Cary
Coglianese & Jennifer Nash, Management -Based Strategies for Improving
Private Sector Environmental Performance, FACULTY SCHOLARSHIP REPOSITORY
(2005), available at http://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article
=1104&context=faculty_scholarship, archived at http://perma.cc/9FCZ-K87L.
50. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 13.
51. For a discussion and citations, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 64.
52. Id. For a recent discussion of the twenty-dollar bill argument, see David
Bornstein, Investing in Energy Efficiency Pays Off, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 6, 2015,
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scope of this essay, but below I explore the reasons why it is
plausible to believe that the gap is large enough for private
governance initiatives to achieve annual emissions reductions in
the billion-ton range over the next decade. I begin by explaining
what might motivate the actors who are essential to private
climate governance, then turn to examples of existing initiatives
and viable new initiatives.
A. Motivations for Private Governance
Why is it plausible to believe that private initiatives can
achieve major emissions reductions in the absence of government
coercive power or resources? In general, private initiatives are
possible because corporations and individuals typically seek to
reduce costs, and carbon emissions often arise because of
inefficiencies in the use of fossil fuels and other resources. Private
initiatives also can harness existing support for climate
mitigation, but our analysis does not live or die on the effects of
normative influences on corporate or household behavior.53
Opportunities to increase efficiency often are unexploited because
of widespread market and behavioral failures. No academic
discipline has a monopoly on the theory and methods necessary to
evaluate the motivations for private governance, but work in
economics, psychology, sociology, organizational behavior,
political science, law, and other fields provides valuable
insights.54
An example of a market failure that affects household carbon
emissions is the split incentive that arises when renters pay the
electric bill, but landlords control the purchasing decisions
regarding energy-using appliances. This split incentive limits
landlords’ incentives to purchase efficient appliances, even if the
appliances would produce substantial net cost savings. Similarly,
3:30 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2015/02/06/investing-in-energyefficiency-pays-off/, archived at http://perma.cc/JT8G-VUC6.
53. For a discussion of the reasons why non-profit groups may be able to
induce firms and households to act, see Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond
Gridlock, supra note 1, at 31-33.
54. The focus of this symposium “on the continued expansion of
environmental law into distinct areas of the law, requiring an increasingly
multidisciplinary approach beyond the confines of federal statutes,” accurately
captures an important direction for the field. See generally Benjamin Sovacool,
Energy Studies Need Social Science, 511 NATURE 529, 529-30 (2014).
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an industry market failure occurs when under customary rate
structures ship owners only pay thirty percent of the fuel costs of
shipping goods, with the owner of the goods paying the other
seventy percent, leaving the ship owner with limited incentives to
invest in more fuel-efficient ships or operating procedures.
In addition, a deep literature in psychology, sociology and
behavioral economics has identified behavioral failures regarding
energy, including steep discount rates and pervasive
informational failures. For example, Shahzeen Attari and
colleagues have documented a wide range of these failures, such
as the fact that individuals underestimate by forty times the
amount of energy used by their clothes dryers.55 Our research
team has identified similar failures on issues ranging from motor
vehicle idling to the value of hot water for cleaning hands.56 By
overcoming these types of market and behavioral failures, private
initiatives can accelerate efficiency gains, drawing on corporate
and household self-interest to reduce emissions.
Private initiatives also can draw on two forms of support for
climate mitigation. A small subset of the U.S. population views
climate mitigation as a top priority, and strong preferences for
climate mitigation can be expressed not only at the ballot box, but
through philanthropic decisions, participation in advocacy
groups, decisions in the workplace, and consumer purchasing
decisions. Climate mitigation is a low priority for a far larger
group, however, and government laws and policies often do not
reflect these types of preferences, particularly when concentrated
interests oppose action.57 For the group that supports climate
mitigation but assigns it a low priority, private governance
55. Shazeen Z. Attari et al., Public Perceptions of Energy Consumption and
Savings, 107 PROCEEDINGS OF NAT’L ACAD. SCI. 16054, 16055-56 (2010).
56. See generally Amanda R. Carrico et al., Costly Myths: An Analysis of
Idling Beliefs and Behavior in Personal Motor Vehicles, 37 ENERGY POL’Y 2881
(2009) (demonstrating motor vehicle idling myths); Amanda R. Carrico et al.,
The Environmental Cost of Misinformation: Why the Recommendation to Use
Warm Water for Handwashing is Problematic, 37 INT’L J. OF CONSUMER STUDIES
433 (2013) (demonstrating hot water hand washing myths).
57. See, e.g., Roberto A. Ferdman, A New Pew Survey Shows Americans
Might Finally Be Getting Serious About Global Warming, WONKBLOG (Jan. 15,
2015), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2015/01/
15/new-pew-survey-shows-americans-might-finally-be-getting-serious-aboutglobal-warming/, archived at http://perma.cc/TRE6-HBY4 (noting that climate
change ranked 22nd out of 23 issues in terms of policy priority for 2015).
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provides opportunities to act in ways that require little
investment of time or money, such as selecting a lower-carbon
item when choosing between two comparably priced goods,
making a small, cost-beneficial shift in household behavior, or
opting to do business with a firm that has a positive reputation
on climate issues.
In addition, much of the conservative rejection of climate
science is animated by solution aversion: the fear that
acknowledging anthropogenic climate change will lead to a large,
intrusive government response.58 Private climate initiatives offer
a way to circumvent this problem. Those who place a high value
on small government can acknowledge the existence of the
problem because the solution is not government regulation, but
the use of private organizations and markets to accelerate
efficiency gains. 59
B. Private Climate Governance Initiatives
The remarkable growth of private climate governance in the
last decade is another reason to believe that private initiatives
can generate major reductions at low cost and without
government action. I focus here on large corporations and
households, but other organizations, including small businesses,
religious organizations, civic organizations, and other non-profit
organizations, also can be the source of emissions reductions.

58. For a discussion of the social science on climate beliefs and worldviews,
see Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at 1962.
See also Troy Campbell et al., Solution Aversion: On the Relation Between
Ideology and Motivated Disbelief, 107 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 809
(2014) (discussing “solution aversion”). For a recent blog discussion of the
literature in this area, see Andrew Revkin, How ‘Solution Aversion’ and Global
Warming Prescriptions Polarize the Climate Debate, DOTEARTH (Nov. 10, 2014,
4:01 PM), http://dotearth.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/how-solution-aversionand-global-warming-prescriptions-polarize-the-climate-debate/?_r=0, archived at
http://perma.cc/2NHT-3XAQ.
59. See Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at
1987-88.
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1. Corporations
Initiatives involving corporations can achieve roughly half of
the private governance wedge.60 Corporations not only have
incentives to achieve efficiencies, but they are motivated by
reputational concerns, consumer purchasing concerns, investor
and lender pressure, and employee morale concerns, among
others. Of course, not all corporations are motivated to reduce
emissions. Firms also may attempt to head off more stringent
government requirements, may seek to raise rivals’ costs, or act
in other ways that raise concerns.61
Regardless of the source of motivation, however, the range of
corporate private climate initiatives underway in the U.S. and
around the world is remarkable. One effort, the Carbon War
Room, is pursuing market failures in five corporate sectors with
the goal of achieving total (not annual) emissions reductions of a
billion tons from each sector.62 Other initiatives use corporate,
project, investor, lender, and product disclosure to drive
emissions reductions. For example, the CDP (formerly the Carbon
Disclosure Project) uses the pressure of over $90 trillion in
investor assets to induce firms to disclose their emissions.
Although causation is hard to assess, recent reports suggest that
firms that disclose emissions to CDP have reduced carbon dioxide
emissions by hundreds of millions of tons. Similarly, major
lenders to electric utilities in the U.S. have adopted the Carbon
Principles, which require the disclosure of projected carbon
emissions from proposed new power plants, as well as efforts to
reduce emissions.63 In addition, although product carbon labeling
is less common in the U.S. than in some other countries, our
research suggests that a private product labeling initiative could
have important effects on firms in some sectors.64
60. See Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 51
(discussion of the emissions reduction potential and specific corporate actions).
61. See, e.g., Carolyn Fischer & Thomas P. Lyon, Competing Environmental
Labels, 23 J. ECON. & MGMT. STRATEGY 692 (2014).
62. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 37-38.
63. Id. at 39.
64. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Thomas Dietz, & Paul C. Stern,
Commentary: Time to Try Carbon Labeling, 1 NATURE CLIMATE CHANGE 4, 4–6
(2011). See also Jason Czarnezki, The Future of Food Eco-Labeling: Organic,
Carbon Footprint, and Environmental Life-Cycle Analysis, 30 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
3, 6 (2011).
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Carbon disclosure can have particularly large effects if the
incentives for emissions reductions are transferred through
corporate supply chains. An example of this type of supply chain
contracting activity is a 2010 announcement by Wal-Mart and the
Environmental Defense Fund in which Wal-Mart committed to
reduce its supply chain carbon emissions by 20 million metric
tons, an amount equal to almost half of the emissions from the
US iron and steel industry.65 Global supply chains can transfer
pressure for low carbon goods and low carbon production across
national boundaries, creating incentives to reduce carbon
emissions by suppliers in developed and developing countries.66
2. Households
Private initiatives directed at households can achieve the
other half of the private climate governance wedge. A large share
of these reductions can be achieved through “behavioral wedge”
actions that address market failures and behavioral failures.67
Behavioral wedge initiatives often use the types of non-intrusive,
low cost measures that can be conducted by private advocacy
groups, corporations, and other private organizations.68 Our
research team estimated that the reasonably achievable
emissions reductions from behavioral wedge actions can exceed
roughly 400 million tons per year in the U.S. by 2020, and
amount larger than all of the emissions of France.69
In addition to the behavioral wedge actions, numerous other
actions are targets of opportunity for private governance
initiatives.70 For example, as mentioned above, individuals hold
myths that, if corrected, could yield large emissions reductions
without unrealistic assumptions about altruism or willingness to
change behavior. Individuals not only underestimate their clothes
dryers’ energy consumption by forty times,71 but also believe on
65. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 45.
66. See Michael P. Vandenbergh, Climate Change: The China Problem, 81 S.
CAL. L. REV. 905, 934 (2008).
67. Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 53.
68. Id.
69. See Dietz et al., supra note 42, at 18452.
70. See generally Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1
(detailed discussion of these household actions).
71. Id. at 53, n.248.
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average that they should idle their cars for over four minutes if
they want to save gas and reduce vehicle wear and tear.72 The
accurate period if the goal is to save money is between ten and
thirty seconds, and this idling myth accounts for roughly 15
million metric tons of emissions every year, an amount larger
than the emissions from three of the largest U.S. industrial
sectors.73 Similarly, most people also believe incorrectly that the
use of hot water reduces germs when washing hands, and this
hand washing myth accounts for roughly a million tons of
emissions per year.74
Major emissions reductions also can be achieved through
other uses of information. For instance, the disclosure of energy
efficiency information for existing homes is only beginning to be
possible in multiple listing services. State legislatures are
reluctant to act, but private initiatives that provide energy
information in listings for new and existing homes could drive
builders to build more efficient homes and encourage homeowners
to invest in efficiency measures before putting homes on the
market. Similarly, immediate energy feedback devices in homes
are inexpensive and have yielded substantial emissions
reductions, but under current government-set rate structures
most electric utilities do not have incentives to reduce net
demand for electricity. Not surprisingly, very few homes have
these devices, but private initiatives could fill the gap.
Another promising initiative involves both households and
corporations. Many corporations, including Kimberly-Clark, Sony
Pictures, and others, are beginning to offer programs to induce
employees to reduce their energy use and carbon emissions not
only at work, but at home as well.75 The corporate motivations
for these programs are unclear at this point, but the programs are
becoming more common. If successful, they offer another means
of achieving emissions reductions from the household and
corporate sectors on a large scale.

72.
73.
74.
75.

Id. at 56.
Id. at 57.
Id.
Vandenbergh & Gilligan, Beyond Gridlock, supra note 1, at 63.
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3. Cross-Cutting Initiatives
In addition to initiatives that target corporate and household
behavior, cross-cutting private initiatives can address beliefs and
motivations across many sectors. For example, much of the
rejection of climate science arises from solution aversion and deep
distrust of government.76 Not surprisingly, even as government
climate science studies report increasing scientific certainty about
anthropogenic climate change, conservatives are becoming less
certain. Private governance offers a response that relies on
private actors and actions, and may be more credible to
conservative audiences. In short, private organizations may be
able to establish a climate prediction market that would enable
buyers and sellers to trade predictions about the global average
temperature in 2020 or 2030, with the price of the prediction in
the interim signaling the market’s assessment of the accuracy of
the climate science. By enabling a private actor to assess and
communicate the implications of the climate science, it may be
possible to bypass barriers erected by the worldview of a large
segment of the population.
Similarly, as I mentioned at the outset, one of the greatest
challenges to climate mitigation is the intergenerational collective
action problem: The current generation must bear much of the
cost of climate mitigation, but most of the benefits will accrue to
future generations.77 Deep skepticism exists about the extent to
which individuals care about their legacy, and this skepticism is
reflected in political debates, which often struggle to focus beyond
the next month or the next year, much less the next century or
millennium. Our research suggests, however, that individuals do
value their reputations after they die. When asked, individuals
report on average that if they were allowed to spend $100 on
enhancing their reputation, they would allocate almost $40 to
76. See Vandenbergh et al., A Climate Prediction Market, supra note 22, at
1979. The market we propose differs from other proposed climate markets in
that it would be a private market, rather than one that would be established by
government. See Shi-Ling Hsu, A Prediction Market for Climate Outcomes, 83 U.
COLO. L. REV. 179, 212 (2011); Nate Silver, Best Idea of the Day: Climate Change
Futures Markets, FIVETHIRTYEIGHT.COM (Nov. 23, 2009, 11:57 PM),
http://fivethirtyeight.com/features/best-idea-of-day-climate-change-futures/,
archived at http://perma.cc/US4X-FVAX.
77. See Vandenbergh & Raimi, Leveraging Legacy, supra note 6, at 139-45
(discussing intergenerational issues).
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their reputation after they die, and $60 to their reputation while
they are alive.78
Although legacy appears to have some effect on politicians
(e.g., President Obama’s 2013 Georgetown climate speech focused
largely on legacy issues), governments are unlikely to harness the
public’s legacy concerns in a systematic way. A private
organization, however, could form a climate legacy registry, and
the registry could enable the general public, politicians, and
corporations to record the actions they are taking today, knowing
that the information will be available to the public for many
A private climate legacy registry will not
generations.79
transform the climate policy landscape, but the registry is yet
another example of how it may be possible to shift beliefs,
motivations and behavior if we abandon the conceptual blinders
created by a government-centric view of environmental
governance.
III.

CONCLUSION

Private governance is not a substitute for public governance,
but it offers an approach that reflects the challenge posed by
climate change, the limited policy plasticity faced by governments
in the modern era, and the availability of new institutional tools.
Private environmental governance also provides a window into
the future of environmental law. Increasingly, environmental
lawyers will be called on to look beyond the traditional tools and
targets of environmental law to find solutions to environmental
problems. To do so, they will need to have open minds and to
draw on experts from many fields. The legislative panaceas of the
past may be right around the corner, but it is a risky strategy to
assume that other options should not be pursued in the interim.
It is also a mistake to assume that pursuing other approaches
will reduce the likelihood of more effective public governance. In
fact, the spillover effects of private and public governance are not
well known, and spillover effects are just one of many new areas
of inquiry that emerge when we reject the notion that the
conceptual frameworks of the past are the only, or even the best,
ways to think about the future.
78. Id. at 19.
79. Id. at 1.
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